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Rights of Belonging as Citizenship Rights
Rebecca E. Zietlow1
This paper considers the question of whether it is wise, or just, to root equality
rights in the concept of citizenship. Scholars who argue in favor of doing so view
citizenship as an inclusive concept, pursuant to which people are entitled to fundamental
human rights simply because they are members of our national polity.2 Others point out
the exclusionary nature of rooting rights in citizenship, the danger that only United States
citizens, and not other people who live in this country, will be entitled to individual
rights.3 The inherent problem with linking rights to citizenship is that it may create a
dichotomy between two classes of people – citizens and non-citizens.
Members of Congress have often invoked the concept of citizenship when
enacting legislation defining and protecting what I call “rights of belonging,” those rights
that promote an inclusive vision of who belongs to the national community of the United
States and that facilitate equal membership in that community.4 That tradition dates back
to the Reconstruction Era, when members of Congress expanded the national polity to
include freed slaves and gave themselves the power to protect the individual rights of
people within their jurisdiction. Making newly freed slaves “citizens” had an important
symbolic value for members of the Reconstruction Congress. Members of that Congress
believed that being a United States citizen entitled one to the enjoyment of the
fundamental human rights that slaves had been theretofore denied.5

1

Charles W. Fornoff Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law. Copyright
Rebecca E. Zietlow.
2
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 21 (1999); CASS SUNSTEIN,
THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 175
(2004).
3
See, e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship through the Prism of Alienage, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
1285, 1318 (2002); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY (1997) (pointing out the danger of exclusion in a civic republican model of citizenship).
4
See generally REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (2006). Rights of belonging are rooted in equality, but they promise
more than the procedural notion of equal treatment. Instead, rights of belonging are substantive – they are
intended to create the conditions that enable outsiders to belong as full participants in the national
community. For example, the 1964 Civil Rights Act facilitates the belonging of people of color in our
society because it removes barriers to that belonging created by discrimination. Legislation creating
economic benefits such as the 1935 Social Security Act also facilitates participation because it provides the
material conditions for the poorest in our society to survive without a daily struggle, and it promotes
belonging by establishing a connection between the state and the individual. Legislation creating the right
to organize and bargain collectively facilitates both the economic and political participation of working
people in our society. All of this legislation creates rights of belonging because it invites outsiders to join
the national community and declares the national community’s commitment to those outsiders. Id at 6-8,
160-168.
5
See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Belonging, Protection and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship Clause and the
Limits of Federalism, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 310-311 (2000); AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 196
(1998); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1
Const. Comm. 235, 236 (1984).

1

Zietlow – DRAFT
Page 2 of 11

3/6/2008

The inclusive vision of citizenship is an appealing model for members of
Congress who wish to expand rights of belonging based on the view that people are
entitled to equality rights solely because they are members of the national community.
Moreover, statutory rights based on citizenship send a powerful message of inclusion.
When members of Congress enact legislation creating rights of belonging based on
citizenship, they act as representatives of that community expanding it to outsiders.6
Citizenship also is an especially appealing model for those of us who value congressional
enforcement of rights of belonging. The Supreme Court generally defers to
congressional power to define citizenship.7 This fact is particularly important given that
the Court has recently cut back on Congress’ use of its other powers to protect equality
rights.8
There is both an historical and a conceptual link between rights of belonging and
citizenship rights. The power to define citizenship is equivalent to defining who
“belongs” to the national polity. However, the power to define citizenship also includes
the power to exclude. This is particularly clear when Congress uses its power over
naturalization to define the requirements for becoming a naturalized citizen, to limit the
ability of outsiders to become US citizens, and to limit the receipt of public benefits to
non-citizens. Indeed, Congress’ power over naturalization necessarily includes the power
to exclude.9 When Congress defines the requirements for naturalization, Congress is
defining who can be included, and who excluded, from the national polity.
My theory of rights of belonging is intended to be a more inclusive concept than
citizenship rights because rights of belonging are not limited by the boundaries of US
citizenship. Members of Congress have often invoked the concept of citizenship when
they enact legislation defining and protecting rights of belonging for all people. For
example, supporters of the 1964 Civil Rights Act argued that its purpose was to end the
“second class citizenship” of African Americans in the Jim Crow south, but they drafted
the bill to protect all “persons” against race discrimination.10 Those members of
Congress believed that racial equality was a component of full citizenship rights, but they
did not limit the scope of those rights to U.S. citizens.
Members of Congress often invoke Reconstruction when they expand rights of
belonging, because Reconstruction represents the beginning of Congress’ constitutional
obligation to protect those rights. Therefore, the remainder of this paper will explore
6
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more closely the Reconstruction roots of rights of belonging to understand the meaning
of citizenship to members of the Reconstruction Congress. During debates over the
Reconstruction Amendments and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, members of Congress
expressed an inclusionary vision of citizenship even as they enacted legislation that on its
face protected only U.S. citizens. Thus, the debates raise the question of whether those
members of Congress saw citizenship as a source of belonging or exclusion.
With the Thirteenth Amendment, members of that Congress ended slavery and
empowered themselves to enforce the rights of the newly freed slaves. The vision of
citizenship held by the Framers of the Thirteenth Amendment embodied both economic
and racial equality.11 With the Fourteenth Amendment, the Reconstruction Congress
constitutionalized birthright citizenship and gave itself the power to enforce the rights of
citizenship, and the due process and equal protection right of all persons, against
infringement by the states. Though the terminology varied, the debates of the members
of the Reconstruction Congress over these measures reveal that the same inclusive and
expansive vision of citizenship rights underlay all of these measures.
The concept of national citizenship, and the question of whether such citizenship
bestowed rights upon individuals that could not be denied by states, permeated
congressional debates leading up to the Civil War. Abolitionists in Congress argued that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV prohibited states from denying the
fundamental rights of freed Blacks who were considered to be citizens by the states in
which they lived. Pro-slavery members of Congress refuted these claims, and insisted
that people of African descent could not be citizens. The Supreme Court adopted the proslavery view of citizenship in Dred Scott v. Sanford.12 In his opinion, Justice Taney with
the abolitionists that citizenship was a font of fundamental rights, but he maintained that
people of African descent could never enjoy those rights because they were not, and
could not be, citizens of the United States. Taney’s opinion insisted that people of
African descent were never considered to be of “the People” protected by the
Constitution. Thus, the Court’s Dred Scott opinion was profoundly exclusionary.
One of the primary goals of the Reconstruction Congress was to overturn the
Court’s opinion in Dred Scott and establish freed slaves as citizens.13 Many members of
that Congress believed that they accomplished this goal by enacting the Thirteenth
Amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, and with the Citizenship
Clause of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which was based primarily in Congress’ power to
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. This is intriguing because the Thirteenth
Amendment does not mention citizenship on its face. It prohibits involuntary servitude,
but leaves open the question of which rights are entailed in the resulting freedom that
former slaves would enjoy. A majority of the Reconstruction Congress believed that to
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be free was to be a citizen, and to be entitled to fundamental human rights.14 There was
little disagreement on this issue among supporters of the Reconstruction measures. The
differences arose over whether the Thirteenth Amendment had sufficiently empowered
Congress to enforce those rights against state infringement.
These doubts Act led to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Uncertainty
over Congress’ authority to legislatively overrule the Dred Scott decision prompted
Congress to create birthright citizenship in that Amendment’s Citizenship Clause.15 The
Citizenship Clause, Privileges or Immunities Clause, and Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment empower Congress to define and protect the rights of United States citizens.
The Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses further empower Congress
to define and protect the rights of “any person” within Congress’ jurisdiction. The
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments thus both represent a powerful commitment to
rights of belonging and but their language leave ambiguous the question of whether a
person would have to be a citizen in order to “belong.”
The theory that Congress could extend citizenship rights to newly freed slaves is
reflected in congressional debates as early as 1849. During a debate over the
constitutionality of a South Carolina law that authorized the imprisonment of free Black
sailors from northern states when they entered South Carolina waters, Rep. Hudson of
Massachusetts characterized those laws as “imprisoning the free colored citizens of the
United States who came into their waters.”16 Rep. Ashmun, also from Massacusetts,
elaborated that he believed that since the law was being enforced against “our own
citizens,” it violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Article IV.17 While Hudson
defined the free Black men as United States citizens, and Ashmun defined them as
citizens of Massachusetts, both men agreed that as citizens, those men enjoyed
fundamental rights, including the right to travel, and were entitled to the protection of the
United States constitution. Similarly, in 1850, Rep. Winthrop argued that freed Black
men were citizens under federal law because states had recognized them as free men and
claimed that the law does not distinguish between classes of free men.18 Thus, these
antislavery constitutionalist members of Congress believed that citizenship was a source
of fundamental rights for free Blacks years before the country adopted the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.19
The United States Supreme Court resoundingly rejected this antislavery
conception of citizenship in the case of Dred Scott v. Sanford. Nonetheless, some
members of the Reconstruction Congress continued to articulate the theory rejected by
the Court even before the Fourteenth Amendment overturned the Court’s ruling.
Immediately following the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, Senator Lyman
Trumbull introduced the 1866 Civil Rights Act. The Citizenship Clause of that Act
14
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provided “That all persons of African Descent born in the United States are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States, and there shall be no discrimination in civil
rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.”20 The Act continued, “such citizens, of every
race and color . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishments, pains, and penalties, and to
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.”21
Thus, the 1866 Civil Rights Act purported to establish freed slaves as citizens and
endow them with fundamental human rights.22 As Senator Howard explained in a speech
in support of the Act: “And what are the attributes of a freeman according to the universal
understanding of the American people? . . I do not understand the bill which is now
before us to contemplate anything else but this, that in respect to all civil rights there is to
be hereafter no distinction between the white race and the black race.”23
Introducing the 1866 Act, Senator Trumbull explained that Congress’ power to
enact the bill came from Section Two, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause,
and Congress’ power over naturalization.24 Senator Lane elaborated that former slaves
“are free by the constitutional amendment lately enacted, and entitled to all the privileges
and immunities of other free citizens of the United States.” He argued that Section Two
made it Congress’ duty “by appropriate legislation, to carry out that emancipation” by
enacting legislation such as the 1866 Civil Rights Act.25 These members of the Senate
expressed an inclusive vision of citizenship rights - that once slaves were freed, they
immediately became entitled to the fundamental human rights that inhered in
citizenship.26
In the House, Rep. James Wilson, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee,
speaking on the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights act, agreed that the bill merely
affirmed existing law. “It is not the object of this bill to establish new rights, but to
protect and enforce those which already belong to every citizen.”27 Rep. William
Lawrence elaborated: “Congress has the incidental power to enforce and protect the
20
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equal enjoyment in the States of civil rights which are inherent in national citizenship
(pursuant to the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause) . . . . If it has not, then the
Declaration of Rights is in vain.”28 Rep. John Bingham agreed with Wilson’s and
Lawrence’s theories of the inherent rights of citizenship, though he disagreed with their
view that Congress had the power to enforce those rights before they enacted the
Fourteenth Amendment. Introducing his version of the 14th Amendment (which lacked a
citizenship clause) he explained, “Every word of the proposed amendment is today in the
Constitution of our Country, save the words conferring the express grant of power upon
the Congress of the United States.”29
The 1866 Civil Rights Act was approved by an overwhelming margin over the
veto of President Andrew Johnson.30 The overwhelming vote in favor of the 1866 Act
reflects the strength of the belief in citizenship rights held by members of the
Reconstruction Congress. However, led by Rep. John Bingham, some members of
Congress continued to be concerned that Congress might lack the power to enforce those
rights, especially against state governments.31 They enacted the Fourteenth Amendment
in order to firmly establish congressional power to enforce the rights of citizenship. The
Fourteenth Amendment also establishes the right to due process and equal protection of
the laws for “any persons.” However, the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment reveal
little, if any, dichotomy between the rights that would only be enjoyed by citizens and
those that were not limited to citizens.
Members of the Reconstruction Congress saw citizenship as a means of belonging
to a community. As leaders of the national community, they saw themselves as having a
duty to facilitate the belonging of that community.32 This was most clearly the case with
regard to the newly freed slaves. By making the newly freed slaves “citizens,” members
of the Reconstruction Congress intended to signal that they now belonged to the national
polity and should enjoy fundamental human rights as members of that polity. As citizens,
those newly freed slaves (and the white northern sympathizers in the south) merited the
protection of the federal government. Rep. Wilson of Iowa explained, “The citizen is
entitled to the right of life, liberty and property,” and a remedy for the deprivation of
those rights “must be provided by the Government of the United States, whose duty it is
to protect the citizen in return for the allegiance he owes to the government.”33
28
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The theory that the national government owed its citizens protection in exchange
for their allegiance was particularly compelling given that many freed slaves had joined
the Union army and aided in the Union victory. As Rep. William Windom of Minnesota
explained, “the colored soldier, who has worn the uniform of the Republic and periled his
life for its defense, shall have an equal right, nothing more, with the white rebel yet
reeking with the blood of our murdered defenders.”34 Rep. Hubbard summed it up,
describing the 1866 Act as a “shield of protection over four million American citizens,
including old men, young men, and women and children. They are loyal and faithful,
every one.” They helped on the battlefield and “prayed to God for the success of the
nation’s banner. . . We owe them protection in return for their faithful allegiance.”35 The
social contract theory expressed in the foregoing remarks was widely held by members of
the Reconstruction Congress.36 To the extent that it implies a requirement of allegiance
in exchange for protection, it has a potentially exclusionary edge.
Some members of Congress attempted to use citizenship and race as a wedge
issue to encourage opposition to Reconstruction measures. For example, in response to a
question about whether this amendment would affect the Chinese, Rep. William Higby of
CA says “The Chinese are nothing but a pagan race. . . You cannot make citizens of
them.” He explained, the difference between Negroes and the Chinese is that “They are
foreigners and the Negro is a native.”37 Similarly, Sen. Cowan was concerned that the
Civil Rights Act would naturalize children of gypsies and Chinese.38 These members of
Congress opposed the Reconstruction measures and used nativist arguments against those
measures. However, those arguments did not succeed. Responding to Sen. Cowan, Sen.
Trumbull was not perturbed. He maintained that the law made no distinction between
children of German and Asiatic parents, emphasizing that the bill would apply to all
persons born in the United States.39
Other members of Congress expressed concern that the language of citizenship
could limit the scope of the rights that they were creating. For example, during the
debate over the 1866 Act, Rep. Bingham complained that he did not like the fact that the
bill limited its protections to “citizens.” Bingham argued that the bill was not just
intended to protect freedmen, it was intended to apply to everybody and was expected to
be permanent.40 Bingham’s critique elicited no direct response. Perhaps no response was
due since a few days prior to Bingham’s remark, Rep. James Wilson of Iowa, Chair
Committee on Judiciary, had explained that the Committee recommended an amendment
34
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to the civil rights bill to replace “inhabitants of” with “citizens of the United States in,”
limiting the protection of the legislation to citizens, because it was not clear that Congress
had the power to protect non-citizens.41
During the Senate debate over the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Sen. Wade expressed
concern that Section One of the Act included the term “citizen” but did not define it. He
warned, “If the government should fall into the hands of those who oppose us, they might
misconstrue the term “unless we fortify and make it very strong and clear,” and suggested
striking out the word “citizen” and replacing it with “person.”42 A few days later,
Senator Howard responded to this concern by proposing the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.43 Howard did not believe that it was necessary to debate the
meaning of that clause. Referring to the debates over the 1866 Civil Rights Act, he
stated, “The question of citizenship has been so fully discussed in this body as not to need
any further elucidation.”44
Finally, some members of the Reconstruction Congress made it clear that they did
not believe that their measures would extent to American Indians.45 Responding to Sen.
Johnson’s claim that the bill would make Indians American citizens, Sen. Trumbull
pointed out the limiting phrase in the Act, “and not subject to foreign power.”46 Sen.
Sumner explained that matters with Indians were dealt with by treaty, not by statute, and
were therefore beyond the scope of the Act.47 “Indians not taxed” were eventually
covered under the 1866 Act under a compromise measure, and Indians born within US
borders were covered by the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 This
dialogue suggests that these members of Congress did not believe that Native Americans
“belonged” to the national polity. On the other hand, one of the earliest pieces of antipeonage legislation prohibited peonage on Navajo reservations.49 The equivocal
approach to Indian tribes of members of the Reconstruction Congress reflects the
equivocal nature of the sovereignty of those tribes in the mid Nineteenth Century.
Thus, there is a tension between the inclusive language of equality that permeated
the Reconstruction debates and the fact that some rights that members of that Congress
created were limited to citizens. Perhaps the explanation for this tension is the
predominance of the social contract theory in the philosophy of the day. More likely,
41
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members of the Reconstruction Congress used the language of citizenship so often
because of their overwhelming concern with expanding the national polity to include
freed slaves. Abolitionists had relied on the rhetoric of citizenship to protect the
existence of slavery and during Reconstruction they continued to use that same language
as they abolished slavery and constitutionalized their power to define and protect
fundamental human rights.
The concept of citizenship rights played an important role during the two other
periods in our history marked by a rapid expansion of rights of belonging, the New Deal
and the Second Reconstruction. Members of the New Deal Congress shared a
constitutional vision marked by individual freedom and social citizenship.50 The
Reconstruction roots of the New Deal can be found in the Thirteenth Amendment and its
promise of economic rights. Union activists had long argued that the right to organize
was rooted in the promise of liberty in the Thirteenth Amendment.51 Members of the
new Deal Congress invoked this vision as they enacted the Wagner Act, which created
the right to organize and bargain collectively, facilitating the economic and political
empowerment of workers in our country.52 Supporters of the Act invoked freedom of
expression and freedom from involuntary servitude, reckoning back to their
Reconstruction predecessors.53 New Deal measures also which created an economic
safety net, establishing established a national responsibility for the economic survival of
people in our country, and furthering their ability to belong to the national community
rather than struggling for survival.
Though members of the New Deal Congress invoked the Reconstruction ideals of
equality and economic rights in their model of social citizenship, they failed entirely to
support the cause of racial equality. The measures that they enacted overlooked the gross
inequality, exploitation and violence of the Jim Crow South. They excluded domestic
and agricultural workers from protections for workers due to the pressure from
segregationist members of Congress who represented a part of the country that depended
on the economic exploitation of African American agricultural and domestic workers.54
Behind the scenes lawyers in the Civil Rights Section of Roosevelt’s Department of
Justice began to craft a legal strategy that would address both racial and economic
equality via anti-peonage and anti-state violence litigation.55 In addition, buoyed by the
Wagner Act, the labor movement provided an important starting point for leaders of the
nascent civil rights movement such as A. Phillip Randolph.56 However, notwithstanding
the important advances in economic rights in the New Deal ideology of “social
citizenship,” the New Deal is hardly a model for complete inclusion and belonging.
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In the 1960s, members of Congress again evoked the Reconstruction Era when
they enacted the first civil rights measure since Reconstruction.57 In speeches in support
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Senator Hubert Humphrey explained that it was designed to
end the system of second class citizenship embodied in segregation.58 During this debate,
leaders in the presidential administrations and in Congress often invoked the spirit of
Reconstruction.59 As President John F. Kennedy explained when he introduced the bill,
“One hundred years of delay have passed since President Lincoln freed the slaves, yet
their heirs, their grandsons, are not free. . . .Now the time has come for the Nation to
fulfill its promise. . .”60 Later, President Lyndon Johnson repeatedly linked the bill to
Abraham Lincoln and the fact that the nation had recently celebrated the anniversary of
the Emancipation Proclamation to urge members of Congress to support the bill.61 A
group of House supporters of the bill, including Representatives Bill McCulloch and John
Lindsay, echoed this theme in their statement in support of the bill, arguing in a
memorandum that “the badge of citizenship – extended to Negro as well as white by the
14th Amendment – demands that establishments that do public business for private profit
not discriminate on the grounds of race, color, national origin or religion.”62 Hence, the
language of citizenship has been important to members of Congress expanding rights of
belonging since the Reconstruction Era.
However, there are some dangers that are inherent when members of Congress
invoke citizenship in support of expanding rights of belonging. First, the compromises
necessary in the political process mean that not all outsiders will be included in such
measures. Moreover, those who are furthest out – the most disenfranchised – won’t be
included without a fight. During the New Deal Era, for example, those who were left out
were precisely those who had been excluded from citizenship by the Court’s Dred Scott
decision.
Any decision to facilitate belonging of a particular group implicitly incorporates a
decision not to facilitate the belonging of other groups, arguably creating a hierarchy of
protected categories. The 1964 Civil Rights Act does not draw lines based on citizenship,
but it implicitly draws lines based on other criteria. For example, the 1964 Act prohibits
employers from discriminating on the basis of race, ethnicity and religion but does not
57
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extend its protection to gays and lesbians because it does not prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. However, the exclusion is symbolically more profound
when it is framed in terms of citizenship, limiting who “belongs” to the national polity.
The second problem with linking rights to citizenship is that citizenship marks an
easy place to draw the line of non-inclusion when Congress is dividing up social goods.
For example, Congress has often excluded non-citizens from welfare benefits. Moreover,
during the current political climate, the language of citizenship is almost always used to
exclude. Citizenship most often comes up in debates over immigration reform, with
many people demanding the tightening of borders against illegal immigrants.
Unlike legislation limiting its benefits to citizens, which excludes precisely those
people who are unable to participate in the national polity, legislation creating rights of
belonging for one group of people does not preclude others from advocating for their
rights in the political process. After the New Deal, African Americans then mobilized
and demanded inclusion, and achieved legislation providing for their inclusion during the
early 1960s. In the late 1960s, women did the same.63 Indeed, political engagement
itself is an act of belonging. While the Reconstruction predecessors left us with a strong
inclusive vision of citizenship rights, advocates for rights of belonging must always be
cognizant of the danger of exclusion inherent in the meaning of citizenship.
Nevertheless, legislation creating rights of belonging always preserves the possibility of a
more expansive, inclusive, vision of belonging.
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